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way	of	 its	 armed	 forces’	wartime	 strength	 (currently	being	 increased	 to	
280,000	soldiers).	This	capability	to	mobilise	a	significant	number	of	troops	
raises	the	costs	of	possible	aggression.	
•	 The	Russian-Ukrainian	war	has	breathed	new	life	 into	 the	discussion	on	
















Finland	 will	 invest	 in	 improving	 the	 level	 of	 the	 armed	 forces’	 combat	













































































I. AuTonomy, IndEpEndEncE, FInlAndISATIon
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II. ruSSIA: An opporTunITy And A THrEAT
Finland	views	Russia	 simultaneously	 as	 a	 source	 of	 opportunities	 (mainly	
economic)	and	as	the	greatest	threat	to	its	sovereignty.	From	Finland’s	point	

















to	 change	Finland’s	policy	of	non-alignment,	 employing	both	military	 and	
hybrid	means.	In	turn,	on	the	social	level,	Finland	is	a	frequent	leisure	and	
business	destination	for	the	Saint	Petersburg	middle	class	and	the	Kremlin	elite.	
1. russia as a source of opportunities
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and	Russian	 investments	 in	Finland	were	half	 that	 (1.4%	of	 total	FDI).	Finnish investment 


























Finland	wants	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 benefits	 of	 using	 the	Arctic	Northeast	
Passage	connecting	Europe	and	Asia,	which	may	contribute	to	the	economic	
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2. russia as a source of threats 
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Iv. FInlAnd’S ArmEd ForcES:  











1. The conscript army and the defensive doctrine
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(1) Quantity versus quality.	Since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	Finland	has	con-
ducted	a	number	of	reforms	of	its	armed	forces	guided	by	the	principle	of	replac-























new	armament,	 as	was	 the	 case	when	Finland	replaced	 the	Soviet	Buk	air	
defence	systems	with	the	Norwegian-US	NASAMS	2.	In	general,	the	Finnish	






programmes	Finland’s	defence	budget	 is	 intended	 to	rise	 to	 the	 level	of	2%	
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(2) Conventional versus hybrid conflict. The	Finnish	armed	forces	are	focused	
on	developing	its	capabilities	of	repelling	a	conventional	attack.	However,	the	
conclusions	made	after	 the	Russian	Crimean	operation	have	made	Finland	



















































(5) International co-operation. The	Finnish	armed	forces,	which	until	recently	













































Appendix 1. Finland’s military expenditure in billions of US$ and as a per-
centage of GDP 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3. Finland’s wartime strength of armed forces in thousands 
of soldiers and as percentage of population























Source:	P.	Visuri,	Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine, 1945-1985,	“Finnish	Defence	Studies”,	War	





























Borders in 1939 






Source:	R.	Penttilä,	Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944-89,	London	1991
